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We study the cascading failure of networks due to overload, using the betweenness centrality
of a node as the measure of its load following the Motter and Lai model. We study the fraction
of survived nodes at the end of the cascade pf as function of the strength of the initial attack,
measured by the fraction of nodes p, which survive the initial attack for different values of tolerance
α in random regular and Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. We find the existence of first order phase transition
line pt(α) on a p−α plane, such that if p < pt the cascade of failures lead to a very small fraction of
survived nodes pf and the giant component of the network disappears, while for p > pt, pf is large
and the giant component of the network is still present. Exactly at pt the function pf (p) undergoes
a first order discontinuity. We find that the line pt(α) ends at critical point (pc, αc) ,in which the
cascading failures are replaced by a second order percolation transition. We analytically find the
average betweenness of nodes with different degrees before and after the initial attack, investigate
their roles in the cascading failures, and find a lower bound for pt(α). We also study the difference
between a localized and random attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 2003, a power failure struck northeastern
North America and 55 million people lost power. It is
commonly accepted that the cause of this event was a se-
ries of cascading failures in the power grid [1]. A failure
in one part of the network causes that some region of the
system to be overloaded and this then causes other parts
of the network to fail. This process can repeat multiple
times until a large portion of the network has failed. In
the case of the Northeastern power grid, this process re-
sulted in a widespread blackout.
To explore this phenomenon, we use a model developed
by Motter and Lai [2, 3]. They study the betweenness
of a node, defined as the number of the shortest paths
connecting any pair of nodes in the network that pass
through (but do not end in) this node. A network is con-
structed, and we calculate the initial betweenness b
(o)
i of
each node i. A node can withstand a maximum between-
ness of Li ≡ (1+α)b
(o)
i , where α, the tolerance, is a global
parameter of the system. A fraction (1 − p) of nodes is
removed, and the betweenness of the surviving nodes is
recalculated. The nodes whose betweenness bi is greater
than Li are destroyed and removed from the network.
The betweenness of the surviving nodes is again recal-
culated, and the nodes whose new betweenness exceed
Li are removed. This process is repeated until no more
nodes fail due to overload and we find the fraction of sur-
vived nodes pf(p, α) < p. We find that function pf (p, α)
has a first order discontinuity at p = pt(α). Above this
point, the network is intact, and a majority of the surviv-
ing nodes are part of a giant component P∞. The rest
of the survived nodes are isolated from the giant com-
ponent; because they connect to fewer nodes, they will
have a very low betweenness and, furthermore, will not
contribute to the betweenness of the nodes of the giant
component. Although these nodes technically survive,
they do not contribute to the global connectivity of the
network. Thus, we will often focus only on the size of
the giant component P∞, rather than the total number
of surviving nodes. If p < pt, the giant component disap-
pears, but the fraction of survived nodes pf is still finite.
Most of the research until now has explored the effects
of the failure of a single node [4–8]. We will study nu-
merically the effects of a massive attack on the network,
exploring the values of the parameters which lead to the
networks collapse and the nature of that collapse, also
using analytical insights. In the real world, this massive
attack could come from a natural disaster or a human
attack on a nation’s infrastructure.
We study the behavior of the network when the size of
the attack is close to the ”threshold attack” pt. For initial
attacks (1− p) < (1− pt) the network will survive with a
majority of its nodes intact, while for (1 − p) > (1 − pt)
it will disintegrate. The network will fail approximately
when the nodes that end up with the highest betweenness
after the initial attack have a betweenness that is near
that of their limit. At that point, the failure of a single
node will redistribute the ”load” of that node such that
one or more other nodes will fail in turn. This attack,
then, creates the conditions for a cascade, triggering a
sequence or cascade of failures that will not end until the
network is destroyed.
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FIG. 1. Median surviving network size and number of cas-
cades for a random regular graph as a function of p. The
data presented is the result of averaging over 500 realizations.
Note that the number of cascades peaks just at the first-order
transition, where the size of the surviving network drops sud-
denly, at pt = .771 for N = 5000, k = 5, and α = 1. We
present data for both the size of the largest surviving com-
ponent of the system and the number of nodes that do not
fail due to overload or the initial attack, including isolated
nodes. The significance of these two quantities is discussed in
the introduction.
II. NUMERICAL RESULTS OF THE
THRESHOLD POINT
For sufficiently low tolerances we find that, as a func-
tion of the size of the initial attack (1− p), the behavior
of the network experiences a first order phase transition
at a value of p denoted as pt, in which the destruction
of even a single additional node can trigger a cascade of
failures that causes a network to collapse (Fig. 1). The
principal characteristics of the first-order phase transi-
tion is the bimodality of the distribution of the order
parameter, which can be either the fraction of surviving
nodes or the fraction of nodes in the giant component at
the end of the cascade of failures. For these first-order
transitions, we can numerically find pt as the value at
which the areas of both peaks, corresponding to large
and small fractions of surviving nodes, are equal to each
other[9]. This coincides with the value of p at which the
average length of the cascade reaches a maximum.[23]
The steps in the cascade length, and the associated fluc-
tuations in the number of survived nodes forp < pt are
caused by the discreteness of the number of cascades nec-
cessary to approach the percolation transition of the net-
work starting from the initial fraction of survived nodes,
p. If after the n-th step pn is still larger than the perco-
lation transition, a giant component may still exist, but
its size is small enough for the betweennees of its mem-
bers to be still below the maximal betweeenness. As p
increases, pn also increases, the size of the giant compo-
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FIG. 2. We show pt, the minimum initial survivability of a
catastrophic attack, as a function of the tolerance α in both
random regular graphs and Erdo¨s-Renyi graph. Note that
for identical conditions, the regular graph is more resilient;
as is discussed in the text, the variation in initial degree in
the nodes of the Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs causes some nodes to be
more susceptible to failure. The data plotted were obtained
by studying the results of 50 realizations for each set of pa-
rameters.
nent increases and some of its memberes may exceed the
maximal betweenness. At this point an additional, n+1
step may become necessary, and the average pf will be in
between the large pn and the small pn+1 and starts to de-
crease together with the giant component, while average
number of cascades starts to increase from n to n+ 1.
We studied how the value of the size of the threshold
initial attack pt depends on the different values of the
tolerance α for graphs with different connectivity. In the
case of random regular graphs (RR), we show data for
different values of the degree k. In the case of Erdo¨s-
Renyi graphs (ER) we present data for different values
of the average degree 〈k〉 (Fig. 2). It can be seen, as we
would expect, that as the tolerance increases, the network
becomes more resilient and pt decreases. This feature is
common to both types of networks. For the same toler-
ance, the ER graphs with the average degree 〈k〉 are in
all cases more resilient than the RR graphs with degree
k = 〈k〉. We will show later that at sufficiently high tol-
erances, the collapse of the network changes its nature,
and we observe a more gradual second-order transition.
III. GENERAL RESULTS
In order to better understand the behavior of a graph
under a massive attack, we studied the distribution of the
betweenness of the nodes for the graphs before the ini-
tial attack and just after it (before the cascade of failures
takes place). We start our analysis with the simpler case
3of RR graphs. Before the initial attack, the betweenness
distribution of RR graphs is a sharp Gaussian curve cen-
tered around its mean 〈B〉 ≈ N ln(N/k)/ ln(k − 1)[17].
After the initial attack the distribution presents a struc-
ture in which it is divided into a number of wider curves,
each of which follows a nearly-normal distribution, al-
though with a much larger standard deviation (Fig. 3).
The division of the single Gaussian curve into many
curves as a result of the initial attack is an important
result of this work. The betweenness of a node i sur-
viving the initial attack is essentially determined by the
number of its surviving immediate neighbors, denoted as
ℓi. Specifically, the betweenness is approximately pro-
portional to ℓi(ℓi − 1), which is similar to, although not
identical to, the results found by Goh et al. for scale-free
networks [10], in which a scaling relationship between the
betweenness of a node and its degree was found. A the-
oretical argument for this dependence is given in section
V, and we present a comparison with our numerical sim-
ulations in Fig. 4. After the initial attack, our random
regular graph loses a fraction p of its nodes, causing the
number of surviving first neighbors to vary from node to
node. Most of the nodes for which all of the first neigh-
bors survive will have their betweeness increased due to
the attack. In contrast, those nodes with neighbors that
were destroyed in the initial attack will see their between-
ness decrease. Accordingly, our results show that the ma-
jority of the nodes with all of their neighbors surviving
are the nodes whose betweenness will exceed the maxi-
mum betweenness and will fail first due to overload, thus
driving the phenomena seen in the failure of the network
(see Fig. 3).
Figure 3 provides a lower bound for the value of pt(α)
displayed in Fig. 2 for RR(graphs). Indeed, if we ne-
glect the spread in values of B(ℓ), we can assume that
α0(p) = B(ℓ = k, p)/B0(k) − 1 gives a good approxima-
tion for αt(p), but due to the spread αt(p) > α0(p). Since
both α0(p) and αt(p) are decreasing functions of p, for
sufficiently large p, the same is true for the inverse func-
tions. Thus αt(p) > α0(p) implies pt(α) > p0(α). More
accurate estimates would require the knowledge of the
standard deviation of B(ℓ = k, p), which requires addi-
tional investigation, which goes beyond the scope of the
present paper.
In Erdo¨s-Renyi (ER) graphs, we find similar catas-
trophic failures of the network. However, the mecha-
nism of the failure is slightly different. Because the nodes
have different initial degrees, they also have very differ-
ent initial loads and, thus, different maximum loads. As
mentioned (and showed later in section V and Appendix
A), nodes of lower initial degree will start with lower
betweenness and, correspondingly, lower maximum load.
The initial attack, however, will cause a greater propor-
tional increase in the betweenness of low-degree nodes
than in high-degree nodes, as shown in Fig. 5, provided,
in each case, that all neighbors survive. This will affect
the behavior of ER graphs and the way in which they
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FIG. 3. Betweenness distribution after the initial attack, but
before any failure due to overload, for RR graphs with N =
20000 nodes, k = 5, and p = 0.9. Each curve represents the
distribution of betweenness for a different number of surviving
neighbors, ℓ, normalized so that the peaks are all the same
height. The betweenness distribution before the initial attack
is included for comparison. It is sharply peaked around its
analytical prediction 〈B〉 = N ln(N/k)/ ln(k−1) ≈ 1.20×105 .
These results are the combination of 100 realizations. The
position of the peaks of the curves are approximately in a
2:6:12:20 ratio, showing a dependence on ℓ(ℓ− 1)
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FIG. 4. Analytical results for the mean betweenness of nodes
with different number of neighbors surviving the initial at-
tack as a function of p for a random regular graph. This
graph presents the betweenness immediately after the attack
without any failure due to overload. The symbols represent
simulation results; there are minor discrepancies at very low
values of p. These discrepancies are discussed later.
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FIG. 5. Analytical results for the mean betweenness of nodes
with all surviving neighbors (ℓ = k), as a function of p for an
Erdo¨s-Renyi graph with average degree 5 and size N=5000.
All values are normalized to the mean betweenness for that ℓ
at p = 1, denoted as B0(ℓ). Note that betweenness rises most
for low-degree nodes as p decreases. This graph presents the
betweenness without any failure due to overload. The symbols
represent simulation results; there are minor discrepancies at
very low values of p. Note the difference between this graph
and Fig. 4. Here, we study only nodes in which all their
neighbors survive the initial attack, and examine the effect
of the original degree on the change in betweenness. In Fig.
4, on the other hand, we study nodes with identical original
degrees, in which not all neighbors survive.
disintegrate. The low-degree nodes fail first (in earlier
stages of the cascade and with smaller attacks), causing
further fragmenting of the network (see Fig. 6).
If the attack is widespread enough ( p < pt), this frag-
mentation causes the high-degree nodes to also fail. This
multistage phenomenon does not appear to be operative
to the same extent in RR graphs; in those graphs, rela-
tively few nodes fail before the point where the cascade
of failures becomes catastrophic, while in ER graphs, the
decline in the number of nodes in the giant component
is more gradual as illustrated in Figure 7; the low-initial-
degree nodes fail first, followed by the hubs. Again, the
curve B(k = 2, p)/B(k = 2, 1)− 1 in Fig. 5, provides the
lower bound for pt(α) for the ER graphs.
IV. FEATURES OF THE CASCADES
A. Progress of Cascade
Immediately after a massive attack near pt, the few
nodes with the greatest increase in betweenness fail. As
they fail, other nodes increase in betweenness, and also
fail. Soon, the network reaches a point of catastrophic
failure, in which many nodes fail in each stage of the
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FIG. 6. Fraction of nodes not failing due to overload at each
stage of the cascade, as a function of initial degree. The
data presented is for a case of an Erdo¨s-Renyi graph where
the average degree is 4, N = 10000, tolerance α = .2, and
pt ≈ p = .935. Note that nodes with low initial degree fail
at a greater proportion, particularly at the early stages of the
cascade. The network disintegrates at the end of the cascade;
the surviving nodes do not form a giant component.
cascade (Fig. 7). However, there is an important dif-
ference between RR and ER graphs. RR graphs have
a much more pronounced initial part of the cascade, in
which only a few nodes fail. In ER graphs, instead, we
observe faster degradation of the network from the start
of the cascades. This is due to the difference in initial
degrees; as described, nodes with low initial degrees are
most affected by the initial attack. They thus fail first, in
the early stages of the cascade. Once they fail, the high-
degree nodes fail. This feature is clearly displayed in Fig.
6, where the number of nodes surviving each stage of the
cascade in an ER graph has been studied as a function
of their initial degree.
B. Order of Transition
At high values of α, the fragmentation of the network
due to the failure of a few nodes can never cause a catas-
trophic cascade of failures. This is because the between-
ness presents a maximum as a function of the fraction of
surviving nodes (see Figs. 4 and 5). Note that the aver-
age betweenness per node in the giant component is pNˆL,
where pNˆ is the number of nodes in the giant component
and L is the average path length in the giant component.
As fewer nodes survive, the network becomes fragmented,
leading to longer path lengths and thus a larger average
betweenness. However, at the same time, the fraction
of nodes in the giant component decreases, as nodes be-
come isolated due to the widespread destruction. These
isolated nodes do not contribute to the betweenness; they
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FIG. 7. Size of giant component, as the cascade progresses.
The left graph corresponds to several realizations of a RR
graph with degree 5, N = 5000, α = 1, and p = pt = .7715.
The right graph corresponds to several realizations of an ER
graph with the same parameters and p = pt = .603. Insets
above the graph display the first few stages of the cascade in
greater detail. Note that for the ER graph, the giant com-
ponent loses a significant fraction of its size (the low-degree
nodes) before catastrophic failure begins, while relatively few
nodes fail in the RR graph before the catastrophic portion of
the cascade. Nevertheless, both graphs exhibit a first-order
transition.
do not have paths reaching the nodes in the largest com-
ponent. Thus, as fewer nodes survive the initial attack,
the betweenness decreases. When very few nodes survive,
the second effect dominates, and the mean betweenness
of nodes decreases with further destruction. In a first-
order transition, the original attack causes nodes to fail
due to overload, which will cause the mean betweenness
to increase. This in turn will cause more destruction;
this cascading effect is the scenario that will lead to a
first-order transition.
However, as long as α is sufficiently high to prevent the
network from failing at the point of maximum mean be-
tweenness, the original attack will not cause further fail-
ures. Thus, the network will not fail due to a first-order
transition. Instead, it will fail due to a second-order
transition when the initial attack and associated over-
load reaches the percolation threshold (which, for ran-
dom regular graphs, occurs at 1
k−1 .) We define the pt
for this second-order transition as the point where the
cascade reaches a maximum in length, analogous to the
criterion for first-order transitions.
This shift from first-order to second-order scenarios oc-
curs at the value of α where we would expect pt to equal
the fraction of surviving nodes that yields the maximum
mean betweenness. That is, if pt is small enough such
that the mean betweenness decreases as p decreases, we
will only see a second-order transition, as the fraction of
nodes in the giant component decreases to zero due to
percolation. In the vicinity of this point, we can see the
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FIG. 8. Cumulative frequency distribution of the final net-
work size for a variety of α’s and their corresponding pt’s.
When pt > .32, where the mean betweenness reaches a maxi-
mum (see Fig. 4, albeit for a different N), the distribution has
a plateau, showing a first-order transition in which a midsize
network is unstable. When pt < .32, no such plateau exists;
when the network begins to disintegrate, it becomes more,
not less, stable. The corresponding value of pt for each α is
determined by simulation.
shift from a first-order transition to a second-order tran-
sition as α increases and pt decreases (See Fig. 8). Thus,
the transition between first and second order will occur
when pt is so low that further cascades decrease the av-
erage betweenness, and the only failure possible is due to
the network reaching the percolation threshold, and not
cascading overload.
C. Size Dependence of the Transition Point
The logarithmic dependence of the betweenness on
the system size produces a strong logarithmic depen-
dence of the transition point pt on the size of the sys-
tem N , and also changes the location of the critical
point pc at which the first order phase transition switches
to a second order percolation transition. Fig. 9 (a)
shows the behavior of pt(α) for RR graphs (k = 4),
for N = 10000, 20000, 40000, 80000. One can see that
the larger networks becomes more vulnerable than the
smaller ones. This phenomenon is similar to the one ob-
served in [9] for high dimensional interdependent lattices.
For all values of N , the curves pt(α) approach the critical
point pc ≈ 0.38 from above. Note that this value is al-
most independent of N . Since for larger N , these curves
are going higher, they reach the critical point at larger
values of α. Figure 9 (b) shows the increase of pt as a
function of the size of the system for different α. One can
see that pt(N) grows approximately linearly with ln(N)
above the critical point value pc.
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FIG. 9. (a) Dependence of the transition point pt(α)
on the tolerance α for different system sizes, N =
10000, 20000, 40000, 80000. For large tolerance the curves for
all system sizes converge from above to the critical point
pc ≈ 0.38, at which the bimodal first order transition change
to a unimodal second order transition. (b) Dependence of the
transition point pt(N) on the system size for different toler-
ances α. One can see almost linear increase of pt with lnN .
V. ANALYTICAL CALCULATIONS OF THE
BETWEENNESS
In order to estimate the betweenness, we need to define
an exterior and a shell. We define xn as the fraction of
nodes more than n nodes away from a central node and
yn as the fraction of nodes that are exactly n nodes away.
We further define x∞ as the fraction of nodes that are
isolated from the giant component of the network. These
are all expressed as fractions of N˜ ≡ pN , the size of the
decimated network. By definition,
yn = xn−1 − xn. (1)
In the rest of this section, we will illustrate our findings
for the case of random regular graphs, and will collect
results from Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs in Appendix A.
Following [14], we use the relationship
xn+1 = G0(G1[G
−1
0 (xn)]), (2)
where G0 is the generating function of the network, G1 ≡
G′
0
(x)
G′
0
(1) is the generating function of the branching proces,
and G−10 is the inverse of G0.
In the case of RR graphs this expression becomes,
xn+1 = (x
k−1
k
n )
k = xk−1n (3)
It is known [11] that if a random fraction (1−p) of the
nodes are destroyed in a network which initially had a
generating function given by G0(x), the generating func-
tion of the decimated network becomes G0(1 − p + px)
for the same function G0. Thus, for a decimated random
regular network with initial degree k, we obtain
xn+1 = (1− p+ px
k−1
k
n )
k. (4)
This relationship allows us to create shells of nodes
around a central node which ends up with ℓ surviving
neighbors after the initial attack. Setting y1(ℓ) = ℓ/N˜ by
definition, and doing a Taylor expansion of x0(ℓ) around
1, and using Eqs. (1) and (4) for the case n = 0, we
obtain for the case of RR graphs
x0(ℓ) = 1−
ℓ
N˜ [p(k − 1)− 1]
, (5)
With these equations, we are now in a position to
calculate the betweenness of a node i with ℓi surviving
neighbors. In order to proceed, we first study the contri-
bution to the betweenness from paths that leave another
node j and travel through i, where j is a distance d away
from i (Fig. 10) To do so, we recreate the graph, using
j as a new ”central node”, around which we build shells.
When we recreate the graph around j, our original node
i is in a shell a distance d away, and N˜ [xd(ℓj) − x∞] of
the nodes in the network belong to the giant component,
but are farther away from j than the original node i is.
The shortest path between j and any of these nodes in
the d-exterior (of j) must pass through (or originate in)
the d+1-shell, and then travel from there through a link
to the d-shell. We will assume that each of these links
between the d and d + 1 shells (depicted as arrows in
Fig. 10(a)) carries an equal amount of traffic.
(ℓi − 1) of these links branch out of the original node
i; while an average of p(k − 1)[N˜yd(ℓj)− 1] links branch
out from the other nodes (different from i) in the d-shell.
Thus, the contribution to the betweenness of i due to a
single node j a distance d away is
B˜d(ℓi, ℓj) = N˜ [xd(ℓj)−x∞]
(ℓi − 1)
p(k − 1)[N˜yd(ℓj)− 1] + ℓi − 1
,
(6)
In this expression, the numerator of the fraction is the
number of links that branch out from the i node and the
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FIG. 10. A schematic illustration of the calculation of the
average betweenness. (a) derivation of Eq. (6).(b) derivation
of Eq. (10). In panel (a), the original node i with degree ℓi
is placed in the d-th shell of node j, which is depicted at the
center. The exterior of the d-th shell xd of node j with degree
ℓj , xd, is connected to the d-th shell yd by links depicted by
arrows emanating from the d-th shell; ℓi − 1 of those links
belong to node i. We assume that each of these links from
shell yd carries on average equal amount of shortest paths,
from xd to node j. In panel (b), the original node i for which
the total betweenness is calculated is placed at the center, and
the contribution of node j to its betweennes must be summed
for all nodes j and shells d. The connections of node i to the
exterior of the d-th shell of node j, xd are shown by wavy
lines.
denominator is the total number of links that branch out
from all the nodes in the d-shell of j.
This expression contains a slight error; the actual num-
ber of links that branch out of j’s d-shell is a random
variable with a mean at the value given. For computa-
tional simplicity, we treat the mean of the fraction as the
fraction of the means. This simplification causes errors
at low values of p, where there is a greater variation in
the denominator (Fig. 4)). Taking a second order Taylor
expansion of Eq. (6), we find a correction factor of
B˜d(ℓi, ℓj)σ
2
yd(ℓj)
/yd(ℓj)
2 (7)
While we have not calculated σ2
yd(ℓj)
directly, the
approximation should be noted.
With our value of B˜d(ℓi, ℓj) for the betweenness of a
node i due to paths leaving a single node j, we now make
an identical argument for each node j a distance d away
from i, for each value of d (Fig. 10). In order to do
that, we must perform a sum over all j. This requires
calculating the probability distribution of ℓj for a given
node j. Node j will have ℓj surviving neighbors with
probability [14]
P˜ (ℓj , d) = P (ℓj)[G
−1
0 (xd−1)
ℓj −G−10 (xd)
ℓj ]/yd, (8)
where P (ℓj) is the overall fraction of nodes in the net-
work with ℓj surviving neighbors, or C
ℓj
k (1 − p)
k−ℓjpℓj .
Summing over all d and all j we find that the total be-
tweenness is
B(ℓi) =
∑∞
d=1[N˜yd(ℓi)
∑k
ℓj=1
B˜d(ℓi, ℓj)P˜ (ℓj , d)] (9)
≡
∑∞
d=1[N˜yd(ℓi)〈B˜d(ℓi)〉] (10)
This is the closest approximation we have for the be-
tweenness of a node and the equation we use in Fig. 4.
Note that B˜ is proportional to ℓ − 1 and yd is approx-
imately proportional to ℓ, giving us the ℓ(ℓ − 1) depen-
dence of the betweenness discussed in section III
For large N˜yd or p(k − 1) ≈ ℓi − 1, we can simplify the
denominator in Eq. (6) and average over all ℓj (again,
introducing a slight error term due to equating the frac-
tion of the averages with the average of the fractions),
leading to an average value of B˜d for each lj:
〈B˜d(ℓi)〉 ≈ (〈xd〉 − x∞)
(ℓi − 1)
p(k − 1)〈yd〉
(11)
and thus, combining Eqs. (10) and (11),
B(ℓi) ≈ N˜
∞∑
d=1
yd(ℓi)
〈yd〉
(ℓi − 1)
p(k − 1)
(〈xd〉 − x∞) (12)
Note that for ℓi ≈ k, the two fractions are near unity,
and we are left with the intuitive result that the mean be-
tweenness will be the average path length, which we will
call L, multiplied by the network size. This follows from
the observation that
∑
〈xi〉 can be written telescopically
as
∑
(〈xi〉 − 〈xi+1〉) × i ≡
∑
i × 〈yi〉. For other values
of ℓi, note that for small d,
yd(ℓi)
〈yd〉
≈ ℓi
pk
, and thus, for
ℓi = kmax (that is, the betweenness of a node in an RR
graph with all of its neighbors surviving),
B(ℓi) ≈
pNˆℓi(ℓi − 1)L
pkp(k − 1)
=
pNˆL
p2
=
NˆL
p
(13)
where pNˆ , as earlier, is pN(1−x∞), or the total number
of nodes in the giant component. We have explicitly writ-
ten out this prefactor here, to more clearly identify the
dependence of our result on p Using results from [17], we
finally obtain for the betweenness of a node in a random
regular graph of degree k
B(k) ≈
Nˆ
p
(
ln(pNˆ/pk)
ln[p(k − 1)]
) =
Nˆ
p
(
ln(Nˆ/k)
ln[p(k − 1)]
) (14)
While this analysis has been illustrated with random
regular graphs, the results also hold true for any random
graph, mutatis mutandis, and in Appendix A we reobtain
them for Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs.
These results are confirmed within 5%, for p ≈ 1,
where this approximation is most accurate. Note that
the betweenness of the nodes with all of their original
neighbors intact increases as approximately 1/p, which
is the primary cause of network failure.
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FIG. 11. Size of the final giant component as a function of p.
This graph shows the effect of a local attack, and the effect
of several values of λ, a measure of the locality of the attack.
For the case of λ = 1, a random node and the nearest 1 − p
nodes are destroyed. Although this can lead to a cascade
of failures, such a cascade happens only at a relatively low
value of p. Although the exact value of λ has little effect
on the vulnerability, all local attacks are much less effective
than non-local attacks. This graph shows the results from a
random regular graph of N = 5000, k = 5, and α = 1.
VI. LOCALIZED ATTACK
According to our theory, the network becomes vulner-
able because of the variation in the number of surviving
neighbors in the nodes. Thus, a localized attack, in which
most nodes’ neighbors are unaffected, will be less effective
than a comparable random attack. We implement this
local attack by selecting a random node in the network.
This node is destroyed, and the destruction spreads along
the network’s links to each of its neighbors with proba-
bility λ, a measure of the locality of the attack. When
the attack reaches a neighboring node, that node is also
destroyed, and the damage spreads to its neighbors with
the same probability λ. Once 1− p nodes are destroyed,
the initial attack ceases, and we begin to evaluate the
failure of nodes due to overload. This allows us to in-
terpolate between the case of a totally random attack
λ = 1− p and a totally localized attack with λ = 1. Sim-
ulations show (Fig 11), as we expected, that a network
can survive a local attack, even when a random attack
of the same strength would have caused the network’s
collapse. Other models have assumed that the destruc-
tion wrought by an initial attack often spreads to the
attacked nodes’ neighbors first ([12, 13]). However, our
results show the opposite in this model; the nodes closest
to the destruction are the least likely to be overloaded.
This is confirmed by the progression of the cascade in
the case of a localized attack. After the initial attack,
the nodes farthest from the center of the destruction are
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FIG. 12. Fraction of nodes not overloaded, as the cascade
progresses, for different values of d, the distance from the
central node. Note that the nodes closest to the center of the
destruction are the last to be destroyed; because their neigh-
bors are destroyed in the original attack, their betweenness
decreases. Conversely, the nodes farthest from the center of
the destruction fail first; not only do all of their immediate
neighbors survive, more of their distant neighbors survive, in-
creasing their betweenness beyond the values that we have
calculated. The results included are from a random regular
graph, N = 10000, k = 3, α = .2, p = pt = .908, and λ = 1.
The first 8 shells around the central node are completely de-
stroyed in the initial attack and thus are not shown on the
graph.
the first nodes to fail. Only after they fail do the inner
nodes, near the nodes destroyed in the initial attack, fail
(Fig. 12). This difference emphasizes the difference be-
tween the random networks and the networks embedded
in space for which the opposite effect is observed.[18].
VII. CONCLUSION
We have studied, both computationally and analyti-
cally, the effects of widespread attacks on networks that
are susceptible to fail due to betweenness overload. We
study the fraction of survived nodes at the end of the
cascade pf as function of the strength of the initial at-
tack, measured by the fraction of nodes p, which survive
the initial attack for different values of tolerance α in
random regular and Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs. We find the
existence of first order phase transition line pt(α) on a
p − α plane, such that if p < pt the cascade of failures
lead to a very small fraction of survived nodes pf and
the giant component of the network disappears, while for
p > pt, pf is large and the giant component of the net-
work is still present. This feature of the cascading failures
is similar to the phenomenology found in other models
of cascading failures: i.e. bootstrap percolation[19–22]
9k-core percolation[22] and mutual percolation in inter-
dependent networks[23–25]. Exactly at pt the function
pf (p) undergoes a first order discontinuity. We find that
the line pt(α) ends at critical point (pc, αc), in which the
cascading failures are replaced by a second order perco-
lation transition. We analytically find the average be-
tweenness of nodes with different degrees before and af-
ter the initial attack, investigate their roles in the cas-
cading failures, and find a lower bound for pt(α). The
dynamics of cascading failures indicates the existence of
a latent period of cascading failures, during which only
a few overloads occur at each stage of the cascade. This
latent period is more pronounced in RR graphs than in
ER graphs. A similar latent period is present in a more
realistic model of overloads in the power grid based on
a direct current approximation (DC)[26]. Another sim-
ilarity between the Motter and Lai model and the DC
model of the power grid is a complete clusterization of
the network at the end of the cascade. In both models,
the giant cluster remains to be the most vulnerable until
the last stages of the cascade. In the small clusters of
the Motter and Lai model, nodes have low betweenness
and, thus, do not suffer from overloads, without adding
to global transport in the network. In the power grid
model, small self-sustaining islands are likely to survive,
because local transmission lines connecting neighboring
consumers and producers are less likely to develop over-
loads than lines connecting distant parts of the network,
which may develop a huge imbalance of production and
consumption.
Our main finding is that the degree of a node is the
primary determinant of its betweenness, and thus its
risk of overloading. This shows the fragility of nodes
with many surviving neighbors, and of nodes with low
initial degrees in non-regular networks. This knowledge
can be used to stop cascades in their track, or to easily
identify the most vulnerable nodes. This result has
led to new insights on the critical point, at which the
transition shifts from first-order to second-order, and
the effect of the degree of the network, the degree
distribution, the size of the network, and the tolerance
on the stability of the network. We also study the
difference of cascading failures caused by local attacks
and random attacks on randomly connected networks.
We find that localized attacks are less destructive than
random attacks, which is opposite to the behavior of
spatially embedded networks [18].
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IX. APPENDIX A- CALCULATION OF
BETWEENNESS FOR THE ERDO¨S-RENYI
MODEL
For the case of Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, the expression
equivalent to (4) becomes
xn+1 = e
p〈k〉(xn−1). (15)
and the Taylor expansion equivalent to (5) is
x0(ℓ) = 1−
ℓ
N˜ [p〈k〉 − 1]
. (16)
The shell analysis for the contribution of a single node to
the betweenness (equivalent to Eq. (6) yields
B˜d(ℓi, ℓj) = N˜ [xd(ℓj)− x∞]
(ℓi − 1)
p〈k〉[N˜yd(ℓj)− 1] + ℓi − 1
,
(17)
while equation (10) for the total betweenness still re-
mains valid.
In this case the approximations analogous to Eqs. (11)
and (12) are
〈B˜d(ℓi)〉 ≈ (〈xd〉 − x∞)
(ℓi − 1)
p(k)〈yd〉
(18)
B(ℓi) ≈ N˜
∞∑
d=1
yd(ℓi)
〈yd〉
(ℓi − 1)
(p〈k〉)
(〈xd〉 − x∞) (19)
And finally, the result obtained using [17], equivalent
to Eq. (14) becomes
B(k) ≈
Nˆ
p
(
ln(Nˆ/〈k〉)
ln(p〈k〉)
) (20)
for Erdo¨s-Renyi graphs, where 〈k〉 represents the average
degree before the attack.
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